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Family Ties: The European Court
of Human Rights’ Protection of
the Family and its Impact on
Future Litigation
Rebecca J. Cambron
Abstract
With family as the foundation for much of modern society’s
structure, the European Union included familial and parental rights
when protecting individuals from unwarranted government influence
through the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. The European Court of Human Rights’s
recent interpretation of the protection, however, in the case of
Wunderlich v. Germany demonstrates a concerning shift in the Court’s
jurisprudence. This Comment analyzes the shift occurring within the
Court’s jurisprudence with respect to the protection of the family and
parental rights regarding education, exploring the Court’s arch away
from the foundational principles behind the Court’s formation and
advocates for the adoption of levels of scrutiny that would protect
familial rights.
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I.

Introduction

La familia. For most, ‘family,’ whether through blood or other
bonds, shapes who we are and how we see ourselves. Throughout the
development of democratic society, the family has consistently formed
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the foundation. As far back as Aristotle, society’s political relationship
reflected those found in the family.1 Parents, as the guardians of
children, help shape society’s future, including its politics, by molding
their children’s political and social identities.2 This process continues
through to today.
Recently, the European Court of Human Rights (“the ECtHR” or
“the Court”) has questioned the role the family plays in shaping the
next generation.3 In Wunderlich v. Germany,4 the Court moved away
from this historical understanding of the family—focusing on the state’s
role: protecting and in effect determining the best interests of children. 5
On January 10, 2019, the ECtHR upheld a German court’s decision to
interfere with the Wunderlich family by withdrawing a portion of the
parent’s rights regarding their children and forcibly removing the
Wunderlichs’ four children from the family home. 6 The German
government justified its action based on the parents’ choice to educate
their children at home and refusal to send their children to one of the
government-approved schools. 7
Under the Convention on the Political Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”), the state may only interfere with an
individual’s “family life” in certain circumstances.8 Article 2 of the
Protocol to the Convention, which amends the agreement, however,

1.

ISI Archive, The Family as the Basis for Political Existence,
INTERCOLLEGIATE
STUDIES
INST.
(Oct.
8,
2014),
https://home.isi.org/family-basis-politicalexistence[https://perma.cc/26EX-EXYR].

2.

See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS. VIII (Benjamin Jowett trans.) (c. 350 B.C.E),
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.8.eight.html
[https://perma.cc/MA9S-KXH6] (noting the progression of society
through individuals collecting into families, families into villages, and
villages into states).

3.

See Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM] (holding that German authorities’
removal of four homeschooled children from their family home did not
violate Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms) [hereinafter Wunderlich].

4.

Id.

5.

Id. at 11.

6.

Id. at 16.

7.

Id. at 11.

8.

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5,
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E5VU-SG9A] [hereinafter Convention].
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guarantees children the right to an education.9 The Court previously
held that Germany’s law requiring school attendance at either the state
schools or the authorized private schools—but no other alternatives—
did not violate the article.10 Because of the tension between these two
rights, the Court’s decision received much attention both inside and
outside of the European Union.11 The Court’s decision to permit
Germany’s interference with the protected right to family life reflects a
growing trend within the Court in allowing state governments to
determine the balance struck between competing interests, resulting in
the disintegration of parental and familial rights.12
This Comment addresses the Court’s increasingly hostile view
towards the family and its willingness to defer to the state’s judgment
of the “best interests” of the child, usurping the traditional role of the
parents. Part I describes the development of the Wunderlich case and
outlines the Court’s analysis. Part II analyzes the Court’s holding in
light of its recent decisions regarding home education and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms’ Article 8’s protection for family life. This section will further
explore the balance the Court has struck between these two protections
and what that means for future cases. Finally, this Comment concludes
by advocating for the return to the original values of the ECtHR and
proposes the adoption of clear, tiered-levels of scrutiny to better
examine state actions.
9.

Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 9,
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCT
MContent?documentId=090000168006377c
[https://perma.cc/2R2QN5QZ].

10.

Wunderlich, at 12.

11.

See German official did not violate homeschoolers’ rights, European court
says, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 11, 2019, 6:01 PM),
https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/german-officials-did-notviolate-homeschoolers-rights-european-court-says-85674
[https://perma.cc/AN3F-V2H6] [hereinafter German Official]; German
Family Pleads for Help from European Court of Human Rights, Home
School
Legal
Defense
Association
(Apr.
2017),
https://hslda.org/content/landingpages/Wunderlich/
[https://perma.cc/PZ3N-SD6M].

12.

See Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM]; Wetjen and others v. Germany, App.
no. 68125/14 and 72204/14, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 3, 2018),
http://www.iri.edu.ar/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ri-54-SGJurisprudencia-Marzo-CASE-OF-WETJEN-AND-OTHERS-v.GERMANY.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ6D-XHS4] (holding that there had
been no violation of Article 8 by domestic courts in removing the parental
rights of parents involved in corporal punishment against their children
as part of their religious beliefs).
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II. Reasoning Gone Wrong

A. No Harm, Yes Foul?
Since the early 1900s, Germany has effectively prohibited
homeschooling, requiring compulsory school attendance at either state
or private schools.13 Article 1666 of the German Civil Code requires
local family courts to take the “measures necessary” to avoid harming
the best interests of the child, including the obligation to attend
school.14 In 2005, Dirk and Petra Wunderlich’s oldest child reached
school age.15 They decided to educate their daughter at home and
accepted the fines and criminal proceedings the German government
pursued against them for this decision.16 Until 2008, when the family
moved out of Germany, the only penalty or imposition on their family
life that the Wunderlichs faced were the fines. 17
Three years later, however, in 2011, the Wunderlichs returned to
Germany.18 On July 13, 2012, the German State Education Authority
reported the Wunderlichs to the local family court claiming they were
“deliberately and persistently” refusing to send their children to the
local school.19 Based on the State Education Authority’s finding that
the Wunderlichs were creating a “parallel world” for their children, the
Darmstadt Family Court appointed a guardian ad litem for the
children.20
At an oral hearing, the family court withdrew the Wunderlich
parents’ right to determine their children’s place of residence, their right
to make a decision regarding the children’s schooling, and their right
to apply to the authorities on behalf of their children.21 The court based
its decision on its interpretation of the parents’ refusal to send their
13.

German Official, supra note 11.

14.

BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 1666, para. 1,
translation
at
https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p5809
[https://perma.cc/7V47-EAUT] (Ger.).

15.

Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 6, 8 (Oct.
10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM].

16.

Id. ¶ 8.

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Id. ¶ 25.

20.

Id. ¶ 10-11.

21.

Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 12 (Oct.
10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM].
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children to an authorized school as not only a violation of German law,
but also an abuse of parental authority which “risked damaging the
children’s best interests in the long term.”22 The court stated,
“Independent from the question of whether it could be ensured that the
children were acquiring sufficient knowledge through the applicants’
homeschooling, the children’s not attending school was preventing them
from becoming part of the community and learning social skills such as
tolerance, assertiveness and the ability to assert their own convictions
against majority-held views.” 23 The Wunderlichs appealed the
decision.24
On April 25, 2013, the Frankfurt Main Court of Appeals denied the
parents’ appeal.25 The court noted the children and parents’ resistance
to all attempts at conducting a knowledge assessment.26 Regarding the
law, the court found that withdrawing parental authority “presupposed
a significant endangerment of the best interests of the child,” and the
court utilized a balancing of the rights and interests of the children,
parents, and society to reach its ruling.27 The court concluded that the
Wunderlich parents created a danger by forming a “symbiotic” family
system and did not meet the standards of education maintained by the
state.28
A few months later, on August 26, 2013, the German youth office
met with the Wunderlichs and the Education Authority.29 The parents
continued in their refusal to send their children to the authorized
schools.30 Three days later, authorities and police officers removed the
children from the home after they refused to comply with the court
bailiff’s request to come voluntarily.31 On September 12 and 16, 2013,
the children were assessed and determined to meet the appropriate class
and schooling requirements.32
Just prior to the assessments, however, on September 10, the
Wunderlich parents agreed to send their children to school and on
22.

Id. ¶ 15.

23.

Id.

24.

Id. ¶ 13.

25.

Id. ¶ 15.

26.

Id.

27.

Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 15 (Oct.
10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM].

28.

Id.

29.

Id. ¶ 18.

30.

Id.

31.

Id. ¶19.

32.

Id. ¶ 20.
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September 19, the children were returned to their parents.33 Following
the end of the 2013-14 school year, the Wunderlichs’ again pulled their
children out of the state-authorized school.34 On August 15, 2014, in a
parallel proceeding, the Frankfurt Main Court of Appeals found that
despite having underwent learning assessments and attending school for
a time, the parents were still considered to be “endangering” their
children.35 The court did, however, determine that the detriment
suffered by the children in being permanently removed from their home
in order to attend an authorized school would significantly outweigh
the danger posed by having them educated by the Wunderlichs at
home.36 Specifically, the court found that:
“[T]he learning assessment had showed that the knowledge level of
the children was not alarming and that the children were not being
kept from school against their will. Since permanent removal of the
children from their parents would be the only possible way to ensure
the continued schooling of the children, this was no longer
proportionate as it would have a greater impact on the children than
being homeschooled by their parents.”37
The family appealed the original decision removing their parental
rights, but the Federal Constitutional Court refused to hear the case. 38
Having exhausted all state processes, the family appealed to the
ECtHR.39

B. ECtHR’s Reasoning
The Wunderlichs claimed that the German authorities’ interference
with the Wunderlichs’ parental rights and the removal of their children
violated their rights protected under Article 8 of the Convention. 40
Article 8 provides that:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his […] family life […] 2.
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and it

33.

Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 21 (Oct.
10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM].

34.

Id. ¶ 22.

35.

Id. ¶ 23.

36.

Id.

37.

Id.

38.

Id. ¶ 37.

39.

Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 37–38
(Oct.
10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM].

40.

Id. ¶ 32.
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necessary in a democratic society…for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 41
The government did not contest that it interfered with the
Wunderlich’s family life.42 It did, however, claim that such interference
served the legitimate aim of protecting the health, rights, and freedoms
of the Wunderlich children and was necessary in a democratic society,
based on the children “grow[ing] up isolated within their own family
enclave, in which the applicants [the parents] had ensured their children
had established a strong attachment to them, to the exclusion of
others.” 43
The ECtHR explicitly refrained from questioning Germany’s
compulsory education law in its reasoning.44 Rather, the Court looked
exclusively at the balance required under Article 8.45 It divided the
question into two parts, first addressing whether the government’s
actions were based on legitimate aims and then whether the actions
were “necessary in a democratic society.” 46 Ruling that the
government’s withdrawal of parental authority and removal of the
children did serve legitimate ends, the Court relied on the
Government’s assertions that the authorities acted with the intention
of protecting the children and that “there is nothing to suggest that it
[the removal of parental authority] was applied for any other purpose
in the present case.”47 The Court provided no further explanation of
how the removal of children—against their own wishes and the wishes
of their parents—tangibly served the best interests of the children.48
The ECtHR provided a more in-depth analysis of whether the
actions were “necessary in a democratic society.” 49 As part of making
this determination, it considered whether the government’s reasons for
the action were “relevant and sufficient.”50 This requires that “[a]
balance must be struck between the interests of the child and those of
the parent and, in striking such a balance, particular importance must
be attached to the best interests of the child which, depending on their
41.

Id. (citing the Convention, art. 8).

42.

Id. ¶ 39.

43.

Id.

44.

Id. ¶ 42.

45.

Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 42 (Oct.
10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM].

46.

Id. ¶ 40.

47.

Id. ¶ 45.

48.

See id.

49.

Id. ¶ 46.

50.

Id.
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nature and seriousness, may override those of the parent.” 51 In
conjunction with this balancing test, the court grants a “margin of
appreciation” to the national authorities, particularly regarding
intervention for the protection of children.52
Applying this analytical framework, the existence of a more
beneficial environment for the child to grow up in is not sufficient to
create a necessity.53 Rather, the Court identified the Government’s
finding that the children were endangered and socially isolated because
of the parents’ decision to homeschool and held that the German
government’s actions were reasonable and not a violation of Article 8. 54
Even though the government removed the children prior to an
assessment of their actual knowledge, the ECtHR upheld the removal
because it was reasonable in light of the information the youth office
had.55 Taking these justifications into consideration, and because the
Wunderlichs received the proper process and the government’s
measures were proportionate to the dangers, the Court upheld the
withdrawal of partial parental rights and the temporary removal of the
children.56

C. ECtHR’s Precedent on Family Rights and the Balancing of Interests
Hidden beneath the discussion of “government inference,” the
Wunderlichs’ situation rests on a host of previous cases where the Court
addressed compulsory education laws and the parents’ right to have
their child’s education conform to their religious and moral beliefs. 57
Rather than rule on these grounds, however, the Court side-stepped the
question and relied on Article 8 as the basis for its reasoning.58 This
dodge only leads back to the same fundamentally flawed application of
the law, however. This flaw undermines the strike for liberty that the
origination of the Court was for Europe.

51.

Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 46 (Oct.
10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM].

52.

Id. ¶ 47.

53.

Id. ¶ 48.

54.

Id. ¶ 49.

55.

Id. ¶ 51.

56.

Id. ¶¶ 53–55.

57.

See, e.g., Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2006) (prohibiting exemption from compulsory education for
religious homeschool education).

58.

Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 43 (Oct.
10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM].
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Briefly summarizing the Court’s analysis from its jurisprudence on
Article 8, the Court integrates a deference not only for the government’s
determination of a necessity, but also for its determination of the best
interests of the child.59 Determining a violation of Article 8 requires the
Court to find: (1) a predicate government interference with private or
family life, and (2) that either (A) the interference was not in
“accordance with the law” and/or (B) it was not “necessary in a
democratic society” for a specified interest.60 In its application, the
analysis turns into a balancing of the parent’s obligation vs. the child’s
best interest vs. the state’s interest, i.e. the necessity of the interest for
a democratic society. “Necessity” under the ECtHR, “corresponds to a
pressing social need and, in particular, … it is proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued.” 61 Because social needs are best determined by
the state, the Court grants a margin of appreciation for the state’s
action.62 States have a narrow margin of appreciation for interference
with the family life.63 But that margin may fluctuate depending on the
state’s proposed determination under the final portion of the balancing
test: its necessity for a democratic society.64
In comparison, the right to education found in Article 2 of Protocol
1 provides that:
“No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise
of any functions which it assumed in relation to education and to
59.

Id. ¶ 47.

60.

Id. ¶¶ 43-44.

61.

Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 130 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 67 (1988).

62.

Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 47 (Oct.
10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM].

63.

See Haase v. Germany, App. no. 11057/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 90 (2004)
(“While the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing
the necessity of taking a child into care, in particular where an emergency
situation arises, the Court must still be satisfied in the particular case
that there existed circumstances justifying the removal of the child, and
it is for the respondent State to establish that a careful assessment of the
impact of the proposed care measure on the parents and the child, as well
as of the possible alternatives to taking the child into public care, was
carried out prior to implementation of the measure.”).

64.

See id. (“The margin of appreciation so to be accorded to the competent
national authorities will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and
the seriousness of the interests at stake.”); see also Elsholz v. Germany,
App. no. 25735/94, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 49 (ruling that stricter
scrutiny was required when assessing restrictions on such rights as the
parents’ right to access or restricts which would limit current legal
safeguards designed to protect the rights of parents and children, and
holding that under this stricter analysis, Germany violated Article 8 in
denying a father, attempting to maintain his access to his child, sufficient
involvement in the decision-making process).
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teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and
philosophical convictions.”65
Developing a jurisprudence surrounding Article 2, the Court has
sought to balance three competing interests in its jurisprudence: that
of the child’s right to an education, the parents’ right to influence that
education, and, as seen in the jurisprudence, the State’s goal to ensure
pluralism in education.66 Pluralism, according to the Court, is essential
for the preservation of the “democratic society” as conceived by the
Convention.67 In addition to the preservation of pluralism, the state,
under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, serves a fundamental and required
role in regulating education.68 This role neither requires nor denies a
state the ability to impose compulsory schooling laws.69 The Court only
requires that such education be objective and pluralistic in its
presentation.70
Three cases outline the Court’s recent articulation of the balance
of these interests and demonstrate the challenges to both Article 2 and
Article 8. Starting in 1992, the Court considered a single mother’s
complaint against the German state’s decision to require her to send
her son to one of the approved schools. 71 The mother challenged the
requirement based on her religious convictions and concern about the
“academic and moral decline in public schools where her son would be
taught obscenities and become a victim of violent behaviour and
negative socialisation pressure.”72 Given the regulatory authority
presumptively granted to the state over education, the Court held that
the state “must take care that information or knowledge is conveyed in
an objective, critical and pluralistic manner.”73 In doing so, the rights
of the parent cannot be used to deny the child its right to education. 74
The Court found that, after authorities reviewed the mother’s ability
to provide for her son’s education alone, she was not capable and would
65.

Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 9.

66.

Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., 6-7
(2006).

67.

Id. at 6.

68.

Id. at 6-7.

69.

Id. at 7.

70.

Dojan and Others v. Germany, App. no. 319/08, 2455/08, 7908/10, and
8155/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., 14 (2011).

71.

Leuffen v. Germany, App. No. 19844/92, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1-2 (1992).

72.

Id. at 2.

73.

Id. at 3.

74.

Id. at 3-4.
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in fact be damaging her son.75 This reasoning also justified the
interference under Article 8.76
Nearly a decade later in 2006, the Court again dealt with a
challenge to both articles, this time from parents who did not want
their children to receive the sex education classes from either public or
private schools.77 Grounded in their religious concerns, the parents
moved the German courts for exemptions from the compulsory
education system, but where ruled against—not having the right to the
“exclusive education of their children.” 78 Exhausting their claims in
Germany’s courts, the parents filed a complaint before the ECtHR. 79
The Court acknowledged the competing roles of the state and parents
in regulating and influencing the education of the child.80 However,
“respect is only due to the convictions on the part of the parents which
do not conflict with the right of the child to education.”81 In
determining if there was a conflict, the Court granted a “margin of
appreciation” to Germany’s stated objectives—integration and
socialization—holding that “those objectives cannot be equally met by
home education even if it allowed children to acquire the same standard
of knowledge.” 82 This goal, in combination with the parents’ ability to
educate their children after school and on weekends, formed the basis
for the Court’s rejection of the parents’ complaint. 83 Based on these
reasons, the Court also found that the German law did not violate
Articles 8 or 9.84
Most recently in 2011, three couples, all members of the Christian
Evangelical Baptist Church, appealed to the Court from Germany’s
ruling requiring their children to attend a two-day school theater
workshop raising awareness of the problem of sexual abuse.85 The
applicants alleged that the requirement violated Article 2 of Protocol

75.

Id. at 4.

76.

Id.

77.

Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2, 7
(2006).

78.

Id. at 2-3.

79.

Id. at 6.

80.

Id.

81.

Id. at 7.

82.

Id. at 8.

83.

Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., 8
(2006).

84.

Id. at 9.

85.

Dojan and Others v. Germany, App. no. 319/08, 2455/08, 7908/10,
8152/10, and 8155/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 10–11 (2011).
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1, as well as Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention.86 In balancing the
interests, the Court reasoned that the respect granted parents’ rights
did not usurp the responsibility of the State to provide objective
information.87 Rather, the Court found that accommodating every
philosophical or moral objection would strain the State’s ability to
provide educational materials.88 Because the State provided information
in an “objective, critical and pluralistic manner” the Court found the
pluralistic goal sufficiently within the State’s margin of appreciation to
not violate the Convention or Protocol 1. 89

III. Trend Allowing Deference for Government
Interference
Analyzing the application of the balancing test for family rights
and the role of the “needs of a democratic society” demonstrates an
overarching shift in the Court’s precedent away from protecting
educational or familial rights and towards a growing deference to the
State’s determinations.90 This is best seen in the Court’s deference to
pluralism in Article 2 cases and attempts under Article 8 to distinguish
between real and hypothetical harm.91 Ultimately, such imbalance
results in the Court failing to serve its initial purpose and protect
citizens from encroaching state action.

A. “Necessity” as the Mother of Deference
The evolution of family and parental rights within the ECtHR
reflects a dangerous trend towards supplanting the rights of the parents
and family with the State’s determination of the needs of a democratic
society. Within the realm of Article 2 of Protocol 1, the Court’s
jurisprudence demonstrates the one-sided nature of the Court’s
application of the balancing of interests. The protection of family life
86.

Id. ¶ 52.

87.

Id. ¶ 72-74.

88.

Id. ¶ 65 (explaining that although parents may require state schools to
respect their childrens’ religious convictions, in order for institutionalized
teaching to remain practicable, state schools must be able to disseminate
objective information).

89.

Id. ¶ 72-74.

90.

See Jeffery Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 116, 129 (2004) (explaining that the court uses the
balancing test for the margin of appreciation inconsistently).

91.

See George Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 710–11 (2006) (discussing the power left to states
to balance fundamental freedoms with the public interest, in regards to
Articles 8–11).
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exemplified in the Wunderlich case similarly mirrors this trend and
shows its dangerous consequences—ultimately resulting in the State’s
interference in families’ lives when no harm is present.92 Each of the
three cases outlined above, articulates a religiously-based reason for
why parents would wish to find an alternative to the state-authorized
school.93 None of the cases resulted in the outright denial of the child’s
education.94 But in each case, the Court deferred to the State’s objective
of ensuring the socialization and pluralism it deemed necessary.95
Similarly, under Article 8, the balancing test ends up tilted towards
the government with its determinations trumping parents’ rights. This
can be seen in the Court’s struggle to distinguish between a real risk of
harm and religious considerations in Wetjen v. Germany. 96 In Wetjen,
the parent’s believed, based upon their religion, that they had the
obligation to cane their children under the age of 12 when they were
disobedient.97 The Court distinguished the right granted to parents to
pass on their religious and philosophical beliefs from the Wetjen’s
actions stating that, “[w]hile the Court has accepted that this [the
passing on of moral convictions] might even occur in an insistent and
overbearing manner, it has stressed that it may not expose children to
dangerous practices or to physical or psychological harm.” 98 Thus, the
Court’s precedent has created a line drawn around parental rights based
on philosophical beliefs, restricting the communication of those beliefs
when they threaten the state’s determination of what interference is
necessary in a democratic society.
In either case, the analysis ends up tilted towards the state, creating
a near presumption that interference with family life or the state’s
determinations regarding education will not violate the Convention.
92.

Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 51 (Oct.
10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM].

93.

See Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at
6 (Sept. 11, 2006); Dojan and Others v. Germany, App. no. 319/08,
2455/08, 7908/10, and 8155/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12 (Sept. 13, 2011);
Leuffen v. Germany, App. No. 19844/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 18, 1992).

94.

See Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at
3 (Sept. 11, 2006); Dojan and Others v. Germany, App. no. 319/08,
2455/08, 7908/10, and 8155/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16 (Sept. 13, 2011);
Leuffen v. Germany, App. No. 19844/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 18, 1992).

95.

See Konrad and Others v. Germany, App. no. 35504/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at
7 (Sept. 11, 2006); Dojan and Others v. Germany, App. no. 319/08,
2455/08, 7908/10, and 8155/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15 (Sept. 13, 2011);
Leuffen v. Germany, App. No. 19844/92, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 18, 1992).

96.

Wetjen and others v. Germany, App. no. 68125/14 and 72204/14 2018,
Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 77–78 (2018).

97.

Id. ¶ 10.

98.

Id. ¶ 66.
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This overemphasis on the state’s analysis reflects the positive
obligations the Court has interpreted Article 8 and Article 2 to require
from states. As one author noted:
“[This positive interpretation] reflects a social view of human rights
according to which it is the obligation of the State to take whatever
action is needed to promote human dignity and worth. It attributes a
much greater role to the state in the promotion of human welfare than
does the liberal view. In the latter, the individual is to be protected
from the State; in the social view, the individual achieves freedom and
dignity through the State.” 99
While it is not generally disputed that states should interfere in
order to protect individual’s rights from others, such as protecting
children from abuse or ensuring parental access in cases of divorce, the
Court’s acceptance of state interference reaches into the world of
hypothetical harms.
The Wunderlichs’ experience demonstrates this overstep.
“Necessity,” according to the Court’s case law implies the existence of
(a) a “pressing social need” and (b) that the interference is
“proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.” 100 No emergency
situation existed in the Wunderlichs’ home.101 Rather, the State knew
of the family’s intentions and past in choosing to homeschool their
children.102 Yet, the State ended the Wunderlichs’ parental right to
determine where their children lived based the children’s unwillingness
to undergo knowledge assessments.103 But Germany still acknowledged
that the removal was “not necessary from an ex post perspective.” 104
The Court acknowledged that the state’s fears about homeschooling
were outweighed by the damage the removal of the children from the
home had on them—but still permitted the interference. 105

B. (Un)Balanced Interests and the Need to Account for Harm

99.

A.M. Connelly, Problems of Interpretation of Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 35(3) I.C.L.Q. 567, 574-75 (Jul. 1986).

100. Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 130 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 67 (1988).
101. Observations of the Applicants and Application, Wunderlich v. Germany,
App. No. 18925/15, ¶ 42 (Apr. 12, 2017).
102. Id. ¶ 42.
103. Id. ¶ 18.
104. Id. ¶ 95 (quoting Respondent’s observations).
105. Wunderlich v. Germany, App. No. 18925/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 23 (Oct.
10,
2019),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-188994
[https://perma.cc/4PBZ-D3EM].
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Fundamentally, the unbalanced nature of the ECtHR’s
interpretation undermines the principles foundational to the Court.
With the scars of World War II still fresh, the Congress of Europe,
forerunner of the modern European Union, set about to construct a
judicial mechanism to protect
human rights and fundamental
freedoms.106 Lodovico Benvenuti, the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe at the time of the Convention’s adoption, said, “[This
Convention] provides foundations on which to base the defence of
human personality against all tyrannies and against all forms of
totalitarianism.” 107 Described as a “Bill of Rights for free Europe,” 108
the very act of granting more power to the state over the individual or
family subverts the strike for individual liberty made by the acceptance
of the Convention and marks a passive approval of an over-empowered
state. Unlike the International Court of Justice, established through the
United Nations that only has jurisdiction over disputes between states,
the ECtHR’s application process permits individuals to challenge state
decisions.109 In addition to these protections for individuals, the
Convention also provided for the protection of family rights and
education.110
This deference results in no real limitations or guidance for states
actions—like children in need of rules for proper behavior, states may
run wild, legislating as they see fit. As one justice noted, “The empty
phrases concerning the State’s margin of appreciation—repeated in the
Court’s judgments for too long already—are unnecessary
circumlocutions, serving only to indicate abstrusely that the States may
do anything the Court does not consider incompatible with human
rights.” 111 Clarifying the margin of appreciation through the application
of stricter scrutiny, even levels of scrutiny in light of the rights at issue,
could rebalance the scale of justice.
This recalibration would carry with it two benefits. First, it would
better identify that not all state interference is justified in the same
manner. Thirty years have passed without a truly clear articulation of
the “margin of appreciation.” 112 And this is reflected in the
jurisprudence of the court. As such, the state could assert that not
106. J. COLEMAN, THE CONSCIOUS OF EUROPE 18 (Council of Europe 1999)
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Anni_Book_Chapter01_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2T69-KRSV].
107. Id. at 22.
108. Id. at 25.
109. How the Court Works, INT’L CT. OF JUSTICE (2019), https://www.icjcij.org/en/how-the-court-works [https://perma.cc/MLC8-UQNV].
110. Convention, Art. 8.
111. Z. v. Finland, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 323, 357-58 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
112. Brauch, supra note 90 at 125.
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providing a child with a cough drop was just as dangerous to their
health, in the eyes of the state, as withholding emergency medical care.
The Court would have no clearly articulated law which identified the
distinction, intuitive to the world, that those actions should not be
treated the same under the law.
Second, it would recognize that the state does have a role in
ensuring the basic needs of children are met. Even those who categorize
Germany’s actions in the Wunderlich case as inappropriate government
interference, recognize that states have a responsibility to protect
children from abuse.113 Integrating a varied level of scrutiny for
determining the “necessity in a democratic society” of the government’s
interference would maintain the government’s ability to step in when
harm is occurring.114 For example, the Court could distinguish analysis
of state interference in abuse cases, from those involving the right to
education, which initially started the state’s complaint against the
Wunderlichs, and recognize that the right to education did not imply
that any actual, physical harm was being done to the children.

IV. Conclusion
The ECtHR cannot continue to claim to protect the citizens of the
European Union while consistently deferring to State judgments. The
Wunderlich family’s struggles within the Court identify the tension
between these obligations and family rights. Though the Wunderlichs’
caused no harm to their children, the Court permitted the state to step
in and interfere with one of the most fundamental relationships in
society. The tension only escalates when looking at the Court’s rulings
in other cases. Either by denying the need to provide alternatives to
sex education classes or presuming a denial of education based on it
taking an alternative form—the protection enshrined in the Convention
undergoes a constant reinterpretation by the states. Supplanting the
current method of analysis and utilizing a higher standard of scrutiny
that roughly corresponds to the harm actually wrought would help
realign the ECtHR with its founding ideas.

113. See Observations of the Applicants and Application, Wunderlich v.
Germany, App. No. 18925/15, ¶ 42 (Apr. 12, 2017) (explaining that a
state’s interest in protecting children is legitimate).
114. See O’Donnell, supra note 92 at 479, 486.
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